Brigham Young University

BYU ScholarsArchive
Faculty Publications
1988-11-07

Removing Impediments to Water Markets
B. Delworth Gardner
Brigham Young University - Provo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub

Original Publication Citation
Removing Impediments to Water Markets. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, Vol. 42, No.
6, November-December, 1987, pp. 384-388. Also published in Institute Perspective, Institute of
Political Economy, Number 7, 1988.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Gardner, B. Delworth, "Removing Impediments to Water Markets" (1988). Faculty Publications. 3122.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/3122

This Peer-Reviewed Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more
information, please contact ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Institute of Political Economy
Utah State University

UMC 0725

Logan,Utah 84322

(801) 750-2064

Number?
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INTRODUCTION
A few years ago it was mostly economists,
notably those of a libertarian stripe who
were advocating voluntary market exchanges
of water in the West. Now these exchanges,
or transfers as they are sometimes referred
to, are being unabashedly recommended by
water users, politicians, bureaucrats, and even
environmental organizations, who have come
to see their value for achieving a more efficient water allocation. Water markets are an
idea whose time has finally arrived.
The governors of the Western States have
expressed their intent to "influence the outcome of trends which are ~haping the region
and the future of its people" (Western Agenda). Water efficiency was identified by the
governors as one of the three target studies
for 1985-86. This study looked at existing
state, federal, interstate-compact, and international-treaty law and institutions to determine ~ow they govern present practices,
constram change, and enhance or impede efficient use of water. The purpose was "to
identify actions the governors can take to
facilitate options for increasing efficiency,
such as water transfers, salvage of water and
regulation of use" (Western Agenda). '

Th~ Fifteent~ Annual Report of the
Council on EnVIronmental Quality (CEQ)
(1985) contains an excellent chapter whose
primary thrust is to support the development

of water markets: "When water rights and
preferred access to publicly supplied water
and water-based services have been recognized as negotia~le private property, a freer
ma~~et can funct10~. More marketplace competition to determme the use and price of
water can alleviate much, if not all, of the
'need'
for
extensive
new
project
development" (CEQ).
~ong environmental organizations supportmg water markets, none has been more
active nor effective than the Environmental
De~ense. Fu?d, especially its Berkeley,
Cahforma office. Its research in the Imperial
and Central valleys has received much
favorable publicity and has shown the broad
economic and environmental gains that could
result from market transfers from the Imperial Irrigation District to the primarily
urban Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California, and from the seleniumtroubled lands of the Westlands Water District in the San Joaquin Valley to Southern
California (Willey and Graff).
Pe!haps most encouraging of all is the
comm1tment to water markets that has been
developing in the United States Department
of Interior over the past six years since the inauguration of the first Reagan administration.
Several excellent papers have been spawned
in the Office of Policy Analysis. A recent
memorandum states: "It is the policy of the

Bureau of Reclamation that while voluntary
exchanges within states or within basin boundaries will be more easily approved, exchanges involvin~ a larger geographic area will
also be considered" (Department of Interior
memo). Apparently Interior has decided that
federal reclamation laws do not preclude support for and implementation of a voluntary
water exchange policy. "Even if projectauthorizing legislation seems to be in direct
conflict, changes in such legislation will be
supported if project purposes can be
protected or changed to meet current conditions while protecting or compensating third
parties. If existing water service or repayment
contracts need to be revised to comply with
this policy and the proposed water exchange,
those changes will be made in a routine and
expeditious manner ... " (USDI memo).
To one, such as the author of this paper,
who has been advocating water markets for
over 25 years, this support from such a variety
of actors in the public arena is indeed heartening. But advocacy is one thing, changing
lethargic institutions to facilitate markets is
quite another. I believe that we have given
insufficient attention to the tremendous array
of institutional factors that have proved to be
barriers to the formation of functioning water
markets. These barriers are still largely in
place as they have always been. In this paper,
I hope to identify some of these impediments
and indicate what might be done about them.
EFFICIENCY-EQUITY TRADEOFFS
It must be realized that existing laws and
regulations that presently impede free water
transfers were established for good reasons.
Primarily, the reasons center upon equity
concerns, i.e., they protect the wealth positions, broadly construed, of: 1) existing water
users, 2) those economic interests indirectly
affected by existing water uses, 3) broad
geographic regions, and even 4) taxpayers.
This is why we have institutions such as areaof-origin laws, state statutory prohibitions
against exportation of water believed to
belong to a given state, protection against impairment of existin~ water rights, public-trust
protection of "pubhc-good" in-stream uses of
water, and pricmg and allocative rules that allegedly protect the financial interests of the

United States, a surrogate for the nation's
taxpayers.
Barriers to efficient market exchanges
would be much easier to eliminate if ways
could be found simultaneously to mitigate
these equity concerns. Unfortunately, this
may be impossible and some equity may have
to be sacnficed to obtain greater efficiency.
If so, strong resistance to free exchanges of
water can be expected to continue from some
quarters. But this opposition will be
countered by strong support from those who
expect to gain from efficient exchanges and
the greater output that will be produced
therefrom.
Some impediments to flexibility in moving
water to higher-valued uses are found in current water laws and doctrines, both state and
federal, while others have evolved in the administrative practices of federal, state, and
local agencies and oq~anizations. It may be
that the latter are easier to change than the
former which appear to have been more formally and rigidly codified.
LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS
In our decentralized political system,
whenever a change in the status quo
threatens the wealth positions of entrenched
interests, political activity occurs to change
the rules of the game so as to protect those
wealth interests. (Almost always these changes are legitimized in the name of equity.)
One observes this "rent-seeking" activity at
federal, state, and local levels, and in all
branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. There are few better examples of this phenomenon than in the water
field.
Statutory Barriers

With the public's perception that water
demand will soon outstrip supplies, many
regions have adopted defensive strate~ies to
protect their perceived favored position by
erecting legal barriers against market transfers of water to higher-valued uses. Since
1968, the federal government has by law been
prohibited from even studying any potential
water transfers into the Colorado River basin,
a prohibition promoted by the Columbia
River states, the most obvious source of such

water. The alleged purpose has been to head
off any possible moves by Southern California, which is perceived to be desperately in
need of shoring up supplies to accommodate
future population and economic growth.
Even basins, such as the Missouri River,
where only a small fraction of current river
flow is utilized, have encountered strong
political pressure against potential diversions.
An effort by South Dakota to sell unused
Missouri River water to a coal slurry pipeline
company floundered as a result of opposition
from lower Missouri River Basin states, railroads, and barge companies (CEQ, p 321).
Similar actions have occurred in Montana
and Wyoming, where water needed for energy development and transportation was simply declared by state legislatures to be
unavailable for any purposes that require it to
be exported from the state (Gardner, 1986a).
Thus, even though the Supreme Court
found in the Sporhase decision (Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 s. Ct. 3456
[19821) that under the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution, the state of
Nebraska could not prevent a farmer from
moving well water from his property in
Nebraska to irrigate crops on adjacent
property in Colorado, it would appear that
many state legislatures do not believe the
decision has general applicability to all water
transfers that cross state boundaries. It appears certain that this issue will be bitterly
fought in the Courts over many future
decades.
Interstate and International Treaties

There are similar questions about longstanding water allocations among states and
nations incorporated in river compacts and
international treaties. Prominent examples
are the Colorado River Compact and the International Treaty with Mexico, both pertaining to allocating the waters of the Colorado
River (Gardner, 1986a). The city of San
Diego attempted to buy water from ranchers
in Wyoming, located on the upper tributaries
of the Colorado River. There can be little
doubt that the value of water in urban San
Diego is many times that for growing hay and
small grains in Wyoming, and that terms
could have been reached that would have

handsomely benefitted both parties. But any
agreement would have violated the terms of
the Colorado River Compact, at least as understood by those who opposed the transfer,
and it was aborted.
State-Level Jurisdictions

I see no easy solution to these interstate
and international problems short of the creation of unattenuated property rights in water
that would permit unfettered market transactions, even those that cross state and national
boundaries. But how do you develop these
rights that will be recognized nation-wide?
Traditionally, the states have had jurisdiction
over water allocation law and administration,
and some favorable developments have occurred as a result. Market activity is prospering in some states, particularly m New
Mexico, Utah, and Colorado. Giving the
federal government jurisdiction needed to establish water rights that would be recognized
nationally would not likely produce the
desired flexibility, since the most conservative
states would likely hold out for a common set
of rules that would protect their perceived interests. This would appear to be an issue
worthy of attention by the Western Governors, who might use the prestige of their collective offices to bring pressure on
recalcitrant individual state legislatures, who
try to erect barriers to water export.
Still, it is encouraging that many state
regulations that have governed water allocation and have made transfers difficult are succumbing to economic pressures to move
water to more valuable uses. All Western
states require that water be put to beneficial
use, but 1t has never been very clear which
uses are beneficial and which ones are not.
Prioritization generally amounts to little
more than an enumeration of acceptable
uses. Forfeiture of rights is required only
when water is not used at all or is deemed to
be wastefully used.
California settled the legal issue of water
transfers and beneficial use by explicit legislation. California Water Code Section 1244
states that water transfer does not constitute
wasteful or unreasonable use and thus is not

subject to the forfeiture provision of appropriation law.
It appears that another class of historically
legal issues are being gently transformed into
administrative issues, and this will probably
facilitate water transfers.
Federal-Level Jurisdiction

Technically, the Reclamation Act of 1902
provided that federally supplied water be
"a{>purtenant to the lands irngated," and reqmred that the water user be "an actual bona
fide resident on such lands." But subsequent
legislation has negated or repealed these requirements.
There has always been a problem of
whether or not water could be contracted by
the Bureau outside of its designated project
service areas. The Warren Act of 1911 permitted an extension of the irrigation service
area of a project, but this must be done at the
initiative of the Bureau. Under existing legislation, there appears to be no clear authority
for allowing project contractors themselves to
sell or lease water for uses and locations not
envisioned in project authorizations by the
Congress.
Another point of uncertainty is whether
contracted water users can capture gains from
the resale of water in the event that water
markets existed. Obviously, such gains constitute the principal motive for making such
exchanges. With the exception of the Warren
Act contracts, there appears to be no explicit
legislative rrohibitions of this kind, although
as we shal see later, existing administrative
practice often imposes these types of restrictions.
A question might also be raised about
who manages the water in federal projects
when the project payout period has been
completed? Does the Bureau continue to
manage the project (and set the conditions of
transfer) or does management pass to the district owners who have repaid their federal
obligations? The 1902 Act provides for district management and operation of
"reservoirs" by the government "until otherwise provided by Congress." Water transfers
would clearly be easter for the owners of

water districts if they had clear title to project
facilities. The Congress should seize the opportunity provided for in the 1902 Act and
declare the federal government's intention to
transfer all management authority to the districts upon payout, unless maintaining the
facilities and bearin~ the liability cost in case
of some natural disaster would appear to
make such a move infeasible from a private
point of view.
Another complexity in the marketing of
federal water is the acreage limitation which
is imposed by law. Because of reporting requirements in the Reclamation Reform Act
of 1982, the Bureau will know which contractors are qualified to receive subsidized water
and which are not. But will other water
sellers be able to easily ascertain which
potential buyers are qualified? How can
even the buyers themselves know without investing in contracts, information exchange,
and the process of approval with the Bureau?
The stakes are great on most projects, particularly the new ones with the high-cost
water. If the buyer does not qualify for the
subsidized water price and must pay the full
cost as required in the 1982 Act, negotiations
over the sales price will be materially affected. It seems clear that this institutional
baggage associated with the acreage limitation restrictions will greatly increase the
transactions costs of market negotiations and
will prevent many potentially efficient transfers.
I see little economic justification for differentiating between classes of federal water
users, between qualified and limited water
recipients as defined in the 1982 legislation,
and between users in and out of the water
service areas (Huffaker and Gardner). These
distinctions are all reflections of outmoded
equity concerns, and are inimical to the establishment of efficient water markets and
should be eliminated as soon as possible.
Another legal issue causing great uncertainty in the West is the matter of Indian
claims to water. This uncertainty is a strong
deterrent to regional economic development,
since no one knows how much unencumbered
water will be available until the Indians

claims are settled. Most of the water in question is currently being utilized, but not necessarily in those uses or areas that it would be if
the uncertainty about Indian rights did not
exist.
The government should press hard for a
settlement of this issue. If the tribes knew
what water they had and what they could do
with it, the situation would soon clarify. The
Indian wealth position would likely be enhanced if there were few restrictions placed
on the type and place of water use. It may be
highly profitable for the Indians to sell their
water to non-Indians at market-clearing
prices.
ADMINISTRATIVE
IMPEDIMENTS
Federal Issues

The standard federal water contract between the Bureau of Reclamation and its customer-districts reads: "The provisions of this
contract shall apply to and bind the successors and assigns of the parties hereto, but no
assignment or transfer of this contractor any
part thereof or interest therein shall be valid
until approved by the Secretary." Thus, the
terms in these contracts give the Department
of Interior the right to refuse district requests
for reassignment (transfer) of water
deliveries. No doubt one of the purposes of
such terms is to assure that repayment for assigned water will be forthcoming.
It is obvious that a prerequisite for
market transfers is an incentive structure that
permits both buyer and seller to expect to
benefit from the exchange. Two conditions
are vital: 1) the rights to water use must be
firm and transferable, and 2) there must be
no constraints on the process of negotiation
that would deter such a transfer.
Who actually holds the rights to federallysupplied water varies among the states in the
West. They may be held by individuals (including partnerships and corporations), organized
public
water
districts,
or
governmental agencies, such as the Bureau of
Reclamation. The transfer negotiation and
approval process will be greatly complicated
if several entities are involved in the decision.

How decisions are made in the public districts especially is of critical importance, since
a large fraction of water use occurs within
these districts. Much depends on how the
voting power is distributed: one-man onevote, vote proportional to acreage, etc., and
whether or not unanimity or simply a
majority of votes is required to effectuate a
transfer.
In California, the State Water Resources
Control Board (CSWRCB) is required to
issue permits to all nonriparian users of
water. This means that governmental agencies involved in supplr· ng water to districts,
such as the Bureau o Reclamation and the
California Department of Water Resources,
must become permittees of the CSWRCB,
and the agencies actually hold the rights.
However, in other states the water rights to
water supplied by the Bureau are held by the
water districts receiving the water. It would
appear that water transfers would be
facilitated if the rights could be held by the
users themselves, not the agency suppliers. (It
is the users who know what the water is
worth to them.) However, this appears not to
be absolutely necessary. The market transaction could occur by simply allowing a water
contractor to reassign his contractual
deliveries, or some portion thereof, to
another water user, conditional upon the approval of the supply agency.
The "rights" question is somewhat complicated because of the various ways that
rights are denominated. Generally, the more
modem rights are specified in terms of acrefeet of water per acre of land served, or some
other way that fixes the quantity of delivered
water. In contrast, many of the older rights
are simply measured as · a fraction of the
water that exists in the water course at the
time water is delivered for use. Thus, if the
water is leased or sold, there is a question as
to how much water is actually goin~ to be
moved. Only if rights were quantified in
measured amounts would both buyers and
sellers know the water quantities over which
to negotiate. I see no technical reason why
this cannot be done, although some history of
water yield would have to be established for
every water source so that expected quan-

tities available to be traded could be determined. Of course, storage facilities must be
available to even out stochastic water yields
due primarily to random weather.
The question of impairment to other existing rights resulting from water transfers has
always been in the forefront of public concerns over market exchanges. It is the return
flows from some rights that constitute the
water supply for other rights. Thus, transfers
of water could impair other le~itimate rights
if the full entitlement in the right were permitted to move. This outcome may be not be
efficient, and certainly will not be equitable.
For this reason, every state has some agency
that must approve petitions for transfer in
order to protect third-party interests that
depend on return flow.
At least a partial solution to this problem
has been recommended; confine the quantity
transferred to the historic consumptive use of
the seller. The return flows on which other
rights depend would then be minimally affected and there would be little legitimate
third-party resistance to market transfers.
The market would work most efficiently
in inducing water movement to the most
valuable uses if buyers and sellers were unconstrained in negotiating Erices, and if the
seller could capture the difference between
what the water was worth to him and to the
buyer, constrained only by the original repayment obligation to the supply agency.
The Bureau is already on record as to
how it would prefer to handle the repayment
problem (USDI Memo). For short-term exchanges (monthly or annual water rentals
where the water entitlement remains where it
is) the contractual repayment obligation
would remain with the original contractee.
For long-term exchanges, the contractual
obligation may be moved to the transferee.
Any additional costs associated -with the
transfer shall be advanced or repaid in a
manner negotiated by the entities involved.
One thing is made crystal clear in these terms
recommended by the Bureau: the interest of
the United States in project repayment will
be fully protected.

But there are complications. The terms of
repayment granted to the original class of
water use may not, under law, be transferable
to a different class of use. For example,
repayment terms for irrigators (e.g., exclusion
of interest during construction, exclusion of
an interest charge on the outstanding obligation, the availability of repayment assistance
from power revenues, or the limitation of the
costs to be repaid to a specific percentage of
separable costs) are not to be transferable to
municipal and industrial users. If this rule
were not enforced, exchanges between irrigators and municipalities could replace contracts between the Bureau and the urban
users and reduce the total repayment to the
Federal Government (USDI Memo).
The Bureau's position is that an exchange
in which there would be a change in use from
a reimbursable function to a nonreimburseable function will require negotiations. The
purpose of this requirement is stated: "the intent of these renegotiations, under these
situations, is not necessarily to achieve an accelerated repayment, but rather to achieve an
equitable repayment of appropriate costs. To
the maximum extent possible, financial or
economic disincentives to the transfer or exchange are to be avoided" (USDI Memo).
Bureau of Reclamation contract terms
vary between projects and areas. Some
restrict water use to particular lands, usually
within the district, others don't. Some restrict
the end-use of water, some don't. Most limit
the profit from water transfers, but a few
have waived this rule. Some even permit
recontracting. Some permit transfer of
ownership of facilities to the water districts
after repayment obligations have been met.
Some contracts mention return flows, some
don't. The most common contract language
reserves the right to return flows to the US
for project use.
The Bureau professes not to be interested
in the terms of the exchanges between the
negotiating private parties. "The financial
terms negotiated between entities are stated
not to be a subject of interest to the Bureau
of Reclamation" (USDI Memo). This,
however, contradicts actual Bureau practice.

In Idaho ' transfers of Bureau
. . water are
routinely handled by pernuttm~ contractees
to place their surplus water m a "bank"
(Gardner, 1986b). But there is _a bank-administered ceiling on the rental price of water
far below its value. A policy adopted by the
Bureau's mid-Pacific Regional Office in
Sacramento is that within the Central Valley
Project, water may be transferre~ fr,om one
district to another only at the proJect s established contract rates. This "no-profit" policy
clearly removes much of the financial _incentive for water trades. In contrast, in the
Colorado Big Thom{}son project federally
supplied water is routinely sold amon~ water
users at market rates, apparently with the
Bureau's approval, which over time has allowed considerable profits to water users.
It is not clear whether this nonuniformity
in Bureau practice i~ attributable to Bu~eau
initiative to treat different customers in a
variable manner because somehow Bureau
administration is made easier, or results from
effective pressures by powerful Bureau customers for lower water prices _and ot~er concessions deemed to be m their best interest.
In any case this nonuniform policy impedes
market tra~sfers because the Bureau's willingness to approve the terms reached between buyer and seller is not yet established
policy. Thus, the Department of Inter~or
should proceed in h~te to m~tch its poh~
with its current rhetoric of norunterference m
market negotiations.
State Issues
It appears that state administrative poli~
in I?romotin~ market exchanges, at least m
California, 1s lagging behind that of the
federal government. Approval for water
transfers among State Water Project (SWP)
contractors rests with the Director of the
California Department of Water Resources
(DWR). The Director does not use a set. of
clearly established criteria for evaluatmg
proposed water transfers (Curie). Rather,
criteria appear to be constructed on an ad
hoc, case-by-case basis. F~rt~er, even whe~ a
transfer is approved, existmg SWP pohcy
does not permit districts . to. ~egotiate a
market price. A tr_ansferor. 1s hnuted to collecting only a portion of his own water char-

ges from the transferee. Obviously, incentives
for efficient exchanges are lacking.
Madalene Curie has developed criteria
for DWR that she believes would lead to efficient market transfers. They make good sense
for the feds as well. Proposed transfers !Ilust
be submitted to the agency for a dehvery
feasibility check. The fixed project ~barges
would remain with the district holdm~ the
original contrac~ regardless of_'Yhether 1t becomes involved m transfer actiVIty or not, but
any additional costs associated with a
proposed transfer should be paid by the participating districts. Market-transacted w~t.er
may be used in any reasonable and beneficial
way by the purchaser and its price would be
determined by the purchaser and seller
without interference by DWR.
Curie points out that there is an additio~al and significant barrier to the transferee m
the SWP. In its administrative practice, the
SWP acts as a user cooperative and tends not
to approve a transfer without consent of all
customer members. If some members expect
that a proposed trans.fer. will s_i~nificantly
reduce their own security m rece1V1ng water
deliveries, they can objt:ct to th~ tr~nsfer and
likely will be successful m blockin~ 1t. In most
cases of potential transfer, it 1s the lowpriority agricultural contractors who are now
using "surplus" entitlement urban wa_ter ~t
"low" prices that would be harmed 1f this
water were to be sold in a market to the
highest bidder. But since the agricultural
users have not purchased entitlement in this
surplus water, it is difficult to see why they
should have what amounts to a "claim" upon
it.
The remedy would appear to be simple.
DWR should eliminate voting of contr~ctors
as one of the constraints on transfer. This action may not be popular with all contractors
who may be reluctant to give up their blockin~ power in transfer decisions. DWR could
nutigate these objections by being careful not
to approve transfers that would jeopardize
current I?ermanent entitlement rights.
Through time, contractors . would see that
with freedom to transfer entitlement, they actually have more security rather than less.

Summary Table
Water Market Impediments
and Their Solutions
Impediments

Solutions

Legal Impediments

State-Level Jurisdiction

Unattenuated property rights through state
law.

Federal Level Jurisdiction

Give Water district owners clear title to
federal water project facilities.
Eliminate differentiating between classes of
federal water users, i.e., qualified and limited
water recipients.
Government pressure to resolve Indian
claims. Encourage Indians to take advantage
of water market benefits.

Indian Claims

Administrative Impediments

Federal Issues
Ownership of water rights by governmental
agency suppliers
Complex "rights" questions

Allow water contractors to reassign their
contractual deliveries to other water users,
conditional upon the approval of the supply
agency.
Clarify rights positions; quantify rights in
measured amounts.

Impairment of existing rights resulting from
water transfers

Confine the quantity of water transferred to
the historic consumptive use of the seller.

Nonunification in Bureau treatment of different customers

Department of Interior policy to match the
current rhetoric of non-mterference in
market negotiations.

State Issues
No clearly established criteria for evaluating
proposed water transfers; criteria constructed on case-by-case basis

Development of effective criteria; elminiation
of voting of contractors as one of the constraints on water transfers.

CONCLUSION
The corner has been successfully turned;
water markets are here to stay. But there are
many remaining impediments to market
transfers and some of them will prove to be
quite durable. In the West, water is wealth
and water transfers represent transfers of
wealth as well as increases in wealth as water
moves to more valuable uses.
Since the federal and state governments
are playing increasing roles in water development and allocation, it is esyecially encouraging to see a philosophica commitment to

water markets by the Department of Interior.
Vigorous efforts should be made now to
bring law and administrative practice into line
with the stated philosophy. It is not clear that
all federal administrations will be so sympathetic to markets as this one apparently is,
and we should strike while the iron is hot.
State policy should be speedily brought into
line with the emerging federal policy.
A version of this paper was presented at the annual
meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association, Reno, Nevada, July 28, 1986.
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